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

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (22 Oct 69) FOR OT UT 69X025 30 October 1969

SUBJECT: Evaluations of the 116th Engineer Battalion (Combat) and the 131st Engineer Company (Light Equipment)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Transmitted herewith are evaluations of two National Guard units initiated by the Commanding General, Engineer Troops Vietnam.

2. Subject evaluations are provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE
APO 96377

18 SEP 1969

AVBC-CG

SUBJECT: Evaluation of National Guard Units

Commanding General
Engineer Troops Vietnam
APO 96375

1. Reference: Letter, HQ Engineer Troops Vietnam, dated 6 March 1969, Subject: Evaluation of National Guard Units.

2. Attached as inclosure 1 is an evaluation of the 116th Engineer Battalion (Combat) during its period of service with this Brigade.

3. Attached as inclosure 2 is an evaluation of the 131st Engineer Company (LE) during its period of service with this Brigade.

2 Incl
as

J. W. MORRIS
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

FOR OT UT
69X025

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AVCC (18 Sep 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Evaluation of National Guard Units

DA, Headquarters, Engineer Troops Vietnam, APO 96375 [illegible] 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375

1. The evaluation of the performance of these two National Guard units was prepared at my direction with a view to assisting the IA staff in assessing and, if necessary, improving Reserve Component readiness. My letter to the 18th Engineer Brigade with the format for evaluation is attached as inclosure 3.

2. Both units performed well. The 116th Engineer Battalion in particular was outstanding by any standards. From the reports it appears that the most significant improvement in readiness for combat would be the infusion of a few selected officers and NCO's upon mobilization in order to permit a more rapid integration into current Army practices and procedures in field operations and administration. The reports also demonstrate the handicaps of training with makes and models of equipment different from those utilized in actual operations.

3. A corollary observation to this evaluation is the advantage both units gained in their relatively stable personnel postures. The disadvantages of the rapid turn-over in personnel in Regular Army units were clearly driven home to the senior commanders who evaluated these units.

DAVID S. PARKER
Major General, US Army
Commanding

3 Incl
Added 1 incl
3. as

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AVHGC-DST (18 Sep 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Evaluation of National Guard Units

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 4 OCT 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Two National Guard units evaluation reports, prepared in a format similar to the Quarterly Operational Report-Lessons Learned and concerning unit operations for a one-year period, are forwarded for your use in evaluating future National Guard requirements.

2. Major General Parker, Commanding General, Engineer Troops Vietnam, initiated the evaluation with the ultimate objective of assisting DA in improving Reserve Component Readiness by using a comprehensive analysis of the performance of these units in an actual combat environment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

George L Mabry Jr

3 Incl
nc

GEORGE L. MABRY, JR.
Major General, US Army
Chief of Staff

FOR OT UT
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EVALUATION OF NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

THE 116TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)

1. History.

a. The 116th Engineer Battalion (Combat) of the Idaho National Guard is the largest single National Guard unit to have seen duty in the Republic of Vietnam. The unit, with a majority of its personnel from the Idaho Falls area and the surrounding farm country, is further distinguished by having all of its personnel remain assigned to the unit for the entire tour with little infusion of other Army personnel

b. On May 13, 1968 the 116th Engineer Battalion (Combat), ordered into service for every major conflict since the Spanish-American War, was again ordered into Federal Service at its home station. The Battalion had expected to be called up and had pointed their training toward service in Vietnam. They had also gained valuable experience by working with the Forestry Service during many of its weekends.

c. The Battalion completed movement to Fort Lewis, Washington May 18, 1968. In the following weeks training was conducted and preparation for overseas movement was completed. The Battalion deployed to the Republic of Vietnam during August and September 1968. The first unit arrived on August 25, 1968 and the last on September 14, 1968.

d. The mission assigned to the 116th Engineer Battalion was the upgrading and maintenance of QL-20, and maintenance of QL-1 and LTL-8B in the unit's assigned area of responsibility. The unit was also to provide operational support for Task Force South, Engineer Support in construction of MACV Get-Well program, and construction and maintenance of Phan Thiet and Bao Loc airfields.

e. After arriving in country at Phan Rang, the 116th Engineer Battalion moved to its various base camps. Headquarters Company and Company D constructed a base camp at Bao Loc. Companies A and C constructed a base camp at Di Linh. Company B moved to Phan Thiet and constructed its base camp at LZ Betty. In January of 1969, Companies A and C relocated from Di Linh to B'Sar and constructed a new base camp.

f. During the last ten months, the 116th Engineer Battalion was involved in road construction and maintenance, civic action projects, and airfield maintenance and repair. Also, construction of living facilities for MACV advisors, infantry, artillery, and cavalry units in their assigned areas of responsibility was accomplished.

g. The unit trained members of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in the use of engineer equipment as part of the ARVN affiliation program.

Incl 1

h. The actual list of completed projects is as follows:

(1) Improvement of the defense of Bao Loc airfield.

(2) Drilling of exploratory water wells at Phan Thiet.

(3) Permanent repair of Phan Thiet Airfield.

(4) Minimum essential requirements of the Bao Loc Forward Support Activity.

(5) Operational Support of Operation McClain.

(6) Operational Support of the Forward Support Activity at Bao Loc.

(7) Mess Hall for B Battery 5/27 Artillery.

(8) Mess Hall for C Battery 5/22 Artillery.

(9) Guard Towers at Gia Nghia.

(10) Berm Construction for the Logistical Support Activity at Bao Loc.

(11) Engineer Support at LZ Sandy and LZ Sherry.

(12) Concrete Slab for B/7/17 Air Cavalry.

(13) Southeast Asia Huts (SEA) for 3/503rd Infantry.

(14) Minimum Essential Requirements and Revetments for the 3/503rd Infantry.

(15) Minimum Essential Requirements for the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company.

(16) Clear Base Camp Sites for the 53rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN).

(17) Phan Thiet City Bridge.

(18) Shower and Latrine for the 1/568th Medical Company.

(19) SEA huts, Forward Support Activity at Bao Loc.

(20) SEA huts, 1/568th Medical Company.

(21) Construction of a Memorial Chapel.

(22) Construction of B'Sar Camp.

There were, of course, numerous minor projects in addition to those listed above.

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. When the 116th Bn arrived in Vietnam it was immediately capable of performing its primary technical mission. However, the Brigade Commander did not consider it sufficiently well trained in security to warrant its commitment to its intended mission prior to the completion of an in-country orientation dealing primarily with security and knowledge of enemy tactics and techniques. Additionally, just prior to shipment, the unit was issued certain items of replacement equipment of different make and model from that on which it had trained in CONUS. The unit required a brief period in Vietnam to complete training on this equipment.

b. Limiting factors were, as indicated above, insufficient training in the security measures required by the unit's intended mission, and need for "transition training" on certain newly issued equipment.

c. Two major actions might have been taken to improve the readiness of the 116th Bn:

(1) The unit might have been provided, in training, the equipment with which it would operate in Vietnam.

(2) When it had been determined that the 116th Bn would be deployed to Vietnam, the infusion of about 20% active Army officers and 10-15% active Army NCO's, drawn from mid-tour personnel from the intended area of deployment, would have enabled the unit to focus its final training more precisely on minimum requirements and security peculiarities in Vietnam. In addition, although the need for personnel shifts of certain officers and NCO's may not have been apparent prior to their arrival in Vietnam, this requirement became obvious some two months after they had arrived.

d. The 116th Bn underwent 4 months of post-mobilization, pre-deployment training and processing in CONUS. Approximately two months of this time was spent in training, approximately one month in POM leaves, and approximately one month awaiting to deploy. There is evidence that unit morale declined during the final month prior to deployment, and that a 3 month period in CONUS prior to deployment would have been sufficient.

3. Statistical Information.

a. Discipline, law and order:

TYPE	NUMBER
Article 15	126
Summary Court-Martial	0
Special Court-Martial	4
General Court-Martial	0

b. Casualties:

TYPE	NUMBER
KIA	4
WIA	61
KNHA	3
WNHA	10

c. Awards and Decorations:

TYPE	NUMBER SUBMITTED	NUMBER APPROVED
Legion of Merit	2	1
Silver Star	3	0
Air Medal	0	0
Bronze Star	51	38
Bronze Star for Valor	13	14
Army Commendation Medal	244	224
Army Commendation Medal for Valor	3	4
Purple Heart	31	31

d. AGI and CMMI Reports:

(1) The unit received a satisfactory rating (on a satisfactory-unsatisfactory scale) on their AGI conducted 15-19 April 1969. Most areas inspected were termed excellent. The unsatisfactory areas were:

(a) Mess halls in HHC and D Co.

(b) Maintenance management in HHC.

(c) Fire prevention in HHC and D Co.

(2) There was no CMMI inspection of the unit while in RVN.

e. Personnel:

(1) Assigned Strength by Month:

	NG	RA	US	ER
Sep	733	12	8	8
Oct	722	13	11	8
Nov	691	10	8	8
Dec	682	14	8	8
Jan	673	29	24	8
Feb	668	59	41	8
Mar	668	57	39	8

	NG	RA	US	ER
Apr	660	56	10	8
May	646	31	9	8
Jun	640	13	4	8
Jul	637	7	4	8
Aug	635	7	4	7

(2) NG Losses:

Reassigned in Country: 4
ETS: 73
Deceased: 7
Hospitalized: 11
Compassionate Rsg: 4
Hardship Disch: 2

f. Promotions:

E4 - 181
E5 - 148
E6 - 32

g. Sick Call and VD Rates (1 Sep 68 - 31 Jul 69):

(1) Number Treated During Period - 1,972

(a) Non-battle injuries - 80

(b) Battle Casualties - 28

(c) Malaria - 11

(d) Diarrheal Disease - 173

(e) Common Respiratory Disease - 695

(f) Disease of Skin and Cellular Tissue -467

(g) Dermatophytosis - 286

(h) Fever of Unknown Origin - 23

(i) Heat Injury - 39

(j) VD - 152

(2) Number Quarters/Hospitalized - 124/166

(3) Number Evacuated - 11

h. Voluntary Extension:

TYPE	NUMBER
NC's enlisting into RA	2
Extensions on Active Duty	26

i. Organizational Maintenance Records: Average monthly equipment deadline rate was 4.65 percent. A tabulation of material readiness and Forstat Reports reveals that the unit went below C-2 only during the months of April to July 1969. The reason was a shortage of repair parts.

j. Equipment Losses:

TYPE	COMBAT LOSS	ACCIDENT LOSS
Binocular	2	Tent Maintenance - 1
Water Purif Set	1	Truck, 20 Ton, Euclid - 1
Tank Collapsible	1	Compressor, Air, 15 CFM - 1
Pistol, Auto, .45 Cal	1	Truck Utility, ¼ Ton - 1
Rifle, 5.56 mm	3	Truck Cargo, 3/4 Ton - 1

k. Accomplishments/Missions:

	% of Effort
Combat/Operational Support	28%
LOC	57%
Basecon	14%
RDS and other	1%

l. Significant Engagements: The 116th Engineer Battalion had two significant enemy engagements. Both were rocket and mortar attacks on base camps. One occurred on 10 October 1968 and resulted in 1 KIA and 11 WIA. The other occurred on 7 March 1969 and resulted in 1 KIA and 2 WIA.

4. Comparative Analysis:

a. Discipline, Law and Order - Annex A

b. Casualties - Annex B

c. Awards and Decorations - Annex C

d. AGI and CMMI Reports - Annex D

e. Personnel - Annex E

f. Promotions - Annex F

g. Sick Call and VD Rates - Annex G

//

h. Voluntary Extensions - Annex H

i. Organizational Maintenance - Annex I

j. Equipment Losses - Annex J

k. Accomplishments/Missions - Annex K

l. Significant Engagements - Annex L

5. Commanders' Evaluation.

a. Evaluation by BG Elder Annex M

b. Evaluation by BG Morris Annex N

c. Evaluation by COL Fowler Annex O

d. Evaluation by COL Barnes Annex P

e. Evaluation by COL Griffith Annex Q

6. Other Information.

a. Effective orientation of the personnel of a NG unit is an imperative and must not be taken for granted. Their personnel have not voluntarily selected a military career, are not necessarily highly motivated to it, and tend to be intensely critical of actions which they do not understand. In the case of the 116th the commander recognized this need and by continuing orientation of his personnel was able to avert any problem.

b. A greater effort should be made in the future to fill NG engineer units with officers having either formal engineering education or equivalent experience.

ANNEX A

DISCIPLINE, LAW & ORDER

TYPE	116th	70th	14th	19th	27th	39th	20th	299th
Article 15	126	192	169	341	216	208	185	257
Summary Courts-Martial	0	4	5	3	4	4	1	3
Special Courts-Martial	4	30	12	21	20	15	11	21
General Courts-Martial	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3a and reflects the number of UCMJ infractions in the 116th Battalion compared to corresponding RA units. The numbers shown for the 116th Battalion are for the period September 1968 - August 1969. For all other units, the numbers shown are for the period October 1968 - June 1969, the only figures available.

Analysis: The 116th ranked first in the lowest number of UCMJ infractions compared to seven other corresponding RA units.

ANNEX B

CASUALTIES

TYPE	116th	70th	14th	19th	27th	39th	20th	292th
KIA	4	0	1	22	5	12	2	21
KNHA	3	1	2	4	2	3	1	1
WIA	61	25	34	36	45	69	12	53
WNHA	10	2	2	3	15	8	0	1

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3b and reflects the number of casualties inflicted on the 116th Battalion in comparison to those of corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 116th ranked fifth in the lowest number of casualties compared to seven other corresponding RA units.

ANNEX C

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

TYPE	116th	70th	14th	19th	27th	39th	20th	299th
Legion of Merit	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	2
Bronze Star (Achievement)	38	37	3	2	10	10	98	52
Bronze Star (Valor)	14	3	6	18	1	33	8	14
ARCOM (Achievement)	224	55	8	3	30	16	19	56
ARCOM (Valor)	4	1	4	7	3	8	6	5
Purple Heart	31	18	21	36	17	27		48
Unit Awards & Decorations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3c and indicates the number of awards and decorations received by the 116th Battalion in comparison to corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 116th ranked first in the number of awards and decorations for achievement compared with seven corresponding RA units. The 116th ranked fourth in the number of awards and decorations for valor compared with seven corresponding RA units.

ANNEX D

AGI AND CMMI REPORTS

1. AGI Reports (Rating on a satisfactory/unsatisfactory basis.)

116th	70th	14th	19th	27th	39th	20th	299th
Sat	Sat	Sat	Sat	Sat	Sat	Sat	Sat

2. CMMI Reports

There was no CMMI inspection of the 116th Engineer Battalion while in Vietnam.

ANNEX E

PERSONNEL

1. Unit Strengths

UNIT	AUTH	SEP 68	OCT 68	NOV 68	DEC 68	JAN 69	FEB 69	MAR 69	APR 69	MAY 69	JUN 69	JUL 69	AUG 69
116th	812	761	754	717	712	734	776	772	734	694	665	656	653
70th	812	594	630	645	657	770	15	735	700	688	706	715	760
14th	812	662	711	760	722	756	771	747	712	705	728	722	676
19th	812	672	720	681	640	710	759	668	660	690	734	811	774
27th	812	623	725	742	744	806	823	775	743	726	720	712	789
39th	812	633	612	748	701	706	759	739	675	656	720	723	719
20th	812	648	626	690	635	731	758	733	704	721	694	671	757
299th	812	688	629	673	607	714	748	758	714	727	686	683	753

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3e and reflects the overall personnel strength of the 116th Battalion in comparison to corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 116th ranked third in the average number of personnel assigned during the period Sep 68 through Aug 69 compared to seven other corresponding RA units.

2. Personnel Losses

TYPE	116th	70th	14th	19th	27th	39th	20th	299th
Reassigned in Country	4	39	154	167	57	106	103	96
MEDEVAC	11	187	61	88	38	96	44	182
Compassionate Reassignment	4	6	3	2	1	3	0	13
Emergency Leave (PCS)	0	0	9	16	7	4	9	12
ETS	73	259	301	362	297	343	316	391
Early Out	0	0	6	11	5	9	4	5
Hardship Discharge	2	0	5	4	2	2	0	2
Deceased	7	5	4	4	6	20	7	26

The 116th ranked eighth in the total number of losses compared with seven other similar type RA units.

ANNEX F

PROMOTIONS

TO	116th	70th	14th	19th	27th	39th	20th	299th
1LT	0	NVAL	3	0	2	1	15	4
E-6	32		28	4	15	28	34	13
E-5	148		161	109	230	194	332	141
E-4	181		369	114	495	498	610	380

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3a and reflects the number of promotions in the 116th Battalion compared to like promotions for corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 116th ranked seventh in the number of individual promotions compared with six corresponding RA units. Statistics were not available for one unit.

ANNEX G

SICK CALL AND VD RATES

The figures below cover the period 1 Sep 68 - 31 Jul 69. All figures are average monthly incidence only and are not rates based on a 1000 troop strength standard. The Brigade figures are the average incidence for the average battalion in the Brigade less statistics for the 116th, 87th, and 35th Engr Battalions.

CATEGORY	116th Bn	18th Bde RA Bn
Average Strength	939	910
Sick Days	137	92
Daily Non-effectiveness	4.98	3.71
Admissions (Quarters/Hospital)	11.3/15.1	18.8/21.0
Disease	16.5	24.8
Non-battle Injury	7.3	8.9
Battle Casualties	2.5	4.1
Hepatitis	0.1	0.3
Malaria	1.0	1.9
Diarrheal Disease	15.7	15.1
Psychiatric Disorders	0.8	2.4
Character and Behavior Disorders	0.8	0.8
Common Respiratory Disease	64.1	25.1
Disease of Skin and Cellular Tissue	42.5	28.0
Dermatophytosis	26.0	16.5
Venereal Disease (all kinds) non EPTS	13.8	25.4
Fever of Unknown Origin	2.1	3.4
Heat Injury	3.5	0.2
MEDEVAC (See Annex E)		

The medical platoon of the 116th Engineer Battalion, during its year of service in Vietnam with the 18th Engineer Brigade, demonstrated great capacity and efficiency in the performance of its duties. As can be gleaned from the statistics submitted here, the 116th Bn compared favorably with the average figures compiled by all the RA battalions in the Brigade.

As an individual battalion its performance was excellent. In many areas it showed better results than many of our RA units. In VD (fourth lowest in the Brigade), malaria (seventh), psychiatric disorders, and hepatitis, it had a lower incidence than most of the other units. In the fields of skin desease and common respiratory disease, average monthly incidence is anywhere from 60% to 160% above the Brigade average. Two factors account for this: the battalion arrived in country during the monsoon season to relatively unprepared, unprotected living conditions and it is always wet in Bao Loc; second, early medical reporting from the battalion was overly ambitious and tended to include many cases of skin

ANNEX G (Continued)

and respiratory disease that were minor and non-reportable. During the past six months, however, case incidence approached the average for Brigade. This serves as testimony to the high standards of performance and readiness that the medical platoon of the 116th Battalion exhibited during its tour of duty in Vietnam.

ANNEX H

VOLUNTARY EXTENSIONS

TYPE	116th	70th	14th	19th	27th	39th	20th	299th
Reenlistment	2	8	14	9	6	16	18	25
Extensions (EM)	28	2	5	4	4	2	8	9

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3h and reflects the voluntary extensions in the 116th Battalion in comparison to corresponding RA units. The chart applies to enlisted personnel only. There were no voluntary officer extensions in the 116th Battalion.

Analysis: The 116th ranked first in the number of voluntary extensions compared with seven corresponding RA units. The 116th ranked eighth in the number of reenlistments compared with seven corresponding RA units.

ANNEX I

ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE RECORDS

Battalion	Monthly Average D/L Rate (Sep 68 - Jul 69)
116th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	4.65%
70th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	14.5 %
14th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	10.3 %
19th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	8.3 %
27th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	12.5 %
39th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	12.3 %
20th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	9.8 %
299th Engineer Battalion (CBT)	9.7 %

The 116th Engineer Battalion (CBT), consistently maintained the lowest deadline percentage in the 18th Engineer Brigade as compared to like Regular Army Combat Battalions. Some of the reasons for this unusually low deadline rate are as follows:

a. Equipment: When the 116th Engineer Battalion arrived in Vietnam, it was issued a new and complete set of TO&E equipment. No other unit in this Brigade began its service in Vietnam with completely new equipment. This enabled operators and maintenance personnel to have a maintenance starting point that was the same for each item of equipment, making it considerably easier to compare like items of equipment to determine the individuals who were or were not performing proper operational maintenance. It also enabled the maintenance personnel to more rapidly detect problem areas in operator maintenance.

b. Unit Integrity: The 116th Engineer Battalion (CBT) has had the same personnel assigned to them for their entire tour in Vietnam. This simplified the problems involved in training new operators and maintenance personnel and almost completely eliminated the problems that are encountered when a unit has a 100 percent turn over of personnel within a year's time, as often is the case in Vietnam.

c. Previous Training: This unit trained with the same personnel in CONUS that served with them in Vietnam. Each individual was completely aware of his responsibilities toward his equipment and unit prior to arrival in Vietnam.

d. Professional Ability: Many of the men in the 116th Engineer Battalion were assigned responsibilities in the unit that closely resembled their civilian occupation. For example, civilian mechanics were mechanics in the unit; dozer operators in civilian life held that same job in the unit. The professional level of the 116th compared to a like Regular Army Combat Unit was considerably higher because of this civilian experience.

ANNEX I (Continued)

e. Age: The average age in the 116th Engineer Battalion is much higher than in Regular Army Combat Units. Most individuals were married or pursuing a civilian occupation when called to active duty. The maturity of these individuals was a benefit to the unit because personnel were more aware of their responsibilities and had adult attitudes toward the operation and maintenance of equipment.

ANNEX J

EQUIPMENT LOSSES

1. Combat Losses

	116th	14th	19th	20th	27th	29th	70th	299th
Crusher							1	
Truck, tractor 10T			1	3				2
Truck, dump 5T		2	12	4	5	10	?	6
Truck, cargo, 2½T			1	1				2
Truck, cargo, 3/4T			2	1		1		4
Truck, cargo, ¼T			3	1		1		1
Tractor, 290M								
Tractor, D7E			1			3		
Grader, road			1	1				2
Scraper, 18CY								
Shop, equip, 3/4T								
Trailer, 25 T						1		
Truck, tractor 5T								6
Loader, scoop								2
Trailer, ¼T				1				
Crane, RT			1	1				1
Rifle, M14			8	2		9		7
Rifle, M16	3	3	3	1	2			
Launcher, gren, M79			3	2	1	4		2
Pistol, cal. 45	1		1	1		2		1
MG, M60				2				1
Tripod, M60								
Bayonet						16		
Mask, protective						6		4
Detector, mine			2					
Radio set AN/VRC 47								1
Radio set AN/VRC 46				1		2		
Hand set						1		
Radio set AN/PRC 25								2
Radio set AN/GRC 125		1		2	1			1
Telephone set TA-1								5
Telephone set TA312								1
Compressor, 5 CFM					1			1
Pnu Tool & Comp, 250 CFM				1				1
Generator Set, 1.5 Kw				3				2
Generator Set, 3.0 Kw								1
Binocular	2					1		
Tool Kit, Gen Mech		1						
Shotgun		1						
Saw Chain, 18"				1				
Tank and rump unit				1				
Tent, GP, med				12				
Tank, Collapsible	1							
Water Purif Set	1							
Demo Set				2				

ANNEX J (Continued)

2. Accident Losses

	116th	14th	19th	20th	27th	39th	70th	299th
Bayonet				6			10	10
Compressor, 5 CFM				1				
Crane, 20T				1				1
Detector Set Mine				1				2
Dist. water, 1000 gal								1
Generator, 1.5 Kw				1				
Generator, 3.0 Kw							2	
Grader, road							1	1
Launcher, gren M79				1			4	2
Loader, scoop				1			1	
MG, M60								1
Tripod, M60								1
Pistol, cal. 45				2	1		6	
Radio set, AN/PRC 25				2	1			
Radio set, AN/VRC 46					1			1
Rifle, M14				3				3
Rifle, M16				1	8		6	
Saw, chain				1				4
Telephone set, TA1				2				
Tent, GP med				3			5	6
Tent, Maint	1			1				
Trailer, 1½T							1	1
Trailer, 25T				1				1
Trailer, Tank, Water				1				
Truck, cargo, 3/4T	1			1	2			1
Truck, cargo, 2½T				1				
Truck, dump, 5T		3		3	2			2
Truck, tractor, 5T				1	1		1	1
Truck, tractor, 10T		1		1				1
Truck, van, shop								
Truck, util., ¼T	1	1					4	1
Truck, wrecker, 5T				1				
Truck, 20T, Euclid	1							
Compressor, 15 CFM	1							
Truck, tankers, 2½T		1						1
Trailer, basic, 2½T							1	
Tractor, D7E							1	
Trailer, 3/4T							2	

ANNEX K

ACCOMPLISHMENTS/MISSIONS (% OF EFFORT)

	116th	14th	19th	20th	27th	39th	70th	299th
Combat/Operational Support	28.0%	92.8%	45.5%	44.5%	90.0%	70.2%	14.9%	50.8%
LOC	57.0%	0 %	31.4%	21.1%	1.8%	26.9%	37.6%	33.3%
Base Construction	14.0%	6.6%	21.8%	33.7%	7.4%	3.2%	46.5%	15.3%
RDS and Other	1.0%	0.6%	1.3%	0.7%	0.8%	0.7%	1.0%	0.6%

ANNEX L

SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENTS

UNIT	DATE	INCIDENT	CAS & DAMAGE
14th	101600 Feb 69	Mine detonated	3 WIA, 5T combat loss
14th	150045 Mar 69	Ambush	3 WIA
14th	112330 May 69	Rocket & Mortar	6 WIA
14th	170530 May 69	Rocket & Mortar	2 WIA, 10T destroyed
14th	270730 Jun 69	Mine detonated	1 KIA, 2 WIA, 2 ea 5T damage, 1-light, 1-heavy
19th	3 Sep 69	Ambush	2 WIA, 10T damage
19th	12 Jan 69	Ambush	4 WIA, 2 veh light damage
19th	17 Jan 69	Mine detonated	1 KIA, 3 WIA
19th	19 Jan 69	Ambush	1 KIA, 2 WIA
19th	17 Mar 69	Mine detonated	D7E Cbt loss, 2 WIA
19th	22 Apr 69	Ambush	1 KIA, 21 WIA, 5T Cbt loss
19th	24 May 69	Ambush	6 KIA, 10 WIA
19th	17 Aug 69	Ambush	12 WIA, 2 ea 3/4T destroyed
19th	22 Aug 69	Ambush	1 KIA, 8 WIA
Totals for 19th Bn: 9 Incidents; 10 KIA; 64 WIA			
20th	211200 Nov 68	Ambush	Neg Engr Cas, 1 ea 2½T damage, 3/4T damage, one ARVN interpreter WIA
20th	120845 Mar 69	Rocket and Mortar	1 KIA, 1 WIA, light equip damage
20th	070050 Mar 69	Rocket and Mortar	3 WIA
20th	231515 Jun 69	Rocket and Mortar	1 KIA, 2 WIA
20th	232100 Jun 69	Rocket and Mortar	5 KIA
20th	131000 Jul 69	Mine Detonated	2 KIA, 2 WIA, 5T destroyed
20th	211020 Jul 69	Mine Detonated	5 WIA, 5T heavy damage
20th	311900 Aug 69	Mine Detonated Suspected mine field.	4 KIA, 1 WIA, neg damage to dozer
27th	222230 Jan 69	Rocket & Mortar	4 WIA
27th	140410 Apr 69	Ground Attack	3 WIA
27th	142120 Apr 69	Rockey & Mortar	1 KIA, 4 WIA
27th	120215 May 69	Rocket & Mortar	17 WIA, 2½T destroyed
27th	091145 June 69	Ambush	3 KIA, 12 WIA
39th	17 Sep 69	Ambush	8 KIA, 16 WIA
39th	26 Sep 68	Rocket & Mortar	3 WIA, equip damage
39th	5 Mar 69	Rocket & Mortar	3 WIA
39th	19 Mar 69	Rocket & Mortar	1 KIA, 2 WIA
39th	20 Mar 69	Rocket & Mortar	1 KIA, 1 WIA
39th	24 Mar 69	Rocket & Mortar	10 WIA
39th	26 Mar 69	Ground Attack	3 KIA, 11 WIA

ANNEX L (Continued)

UNIT	DATE	INCIDENT	CAS & DAMAGE
39th	12 May 69	Ground Attack	3 KIA, 9 WIA
39th	14 Jul 69	Ambush	2 KIA, 3 WIA
39th	12 Aug 69	Ambush, Rocket & Mortar	1 KIA, 5 WIA, 5T and 3/4T destroyed
70th	210355 Sep 68	Mortar Attack	2 KIA, 9 WIA
70th	121945 Oct 68	Ground Attack	1 KIA
70th	092200 Feb 69	Rocket & Mortar	8 WIA, light equip damage
70th	130110 Feb 69	Rocket & Mortar	4 WIA
299th	26 Feb 69	Mine Detonated	5 WIA, 5T destroyed
299th	5 Mar 69	Ground Attack/ Rocket & Mortar	2 KIA, 3 WIA
299th	11 May 69	Ground Attack/ Rocket & Mortar	14 WIA
299th	20 May 69	Rocket & Mortar	1 KIA, 6 WIA
299th	28 May 69	Rocket & Mortar	8 KIA, 16 WIA
299th	1 Jun 69	Rocket & Mortar	2 KIA, 1 WIA
299th	7 Jun 69	Ambush	2 KIA, 4 WIA
299th	23 Jun 69	Ambush	5 KIA, 20 WIA
116th	10 Oct 68	Rocket & Mortar	1 KIA, 11 WIA
116th	7 Mar 69	Rocket & Mortar	1 KIA, 2 WIA

2. Summary

14th Engr Bn (CBT) - 5 incidents, 1 KIA, 16 WIA.

19th Engr Bn (CBT) - 9 incidents, 10 KIA, 64 WIA.

20th Engr Bn (CBT) - 8 incidents, 8 KIA, 19 WIA.

27th Engr Bn (CBT) - 5 incidents, 4 KIA, 40 WIA.

39th Engr Bn (CBT) - 9 incidents, 19 KIA, 63 WIA.

70th Engr Bn (CBT) - 4 incidents, 3 KIA, 21 WIA.

299th Engr Bn (CBT) - 8 incidents, 20 KIA, 69 WIA.

116th Engr Bn (CBT) - 2 incidents, 2 KIA, 13 WIA.

ANNEX M

EVALUATION OF 116TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)
FROM SEPTEMBER 1968 TO APRIL 1969
BY BG ELDER, CG, 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. When the 116th Bn arrived in Vietnam it was immediately capable of performing its primary technical mission. However, I did not consider it sufficiently well trained in security to warrant its commitment to its intended mission prior to the completion of an in-country orientation dealing primarily with security and knowledge of enemy tactics and techniques. Additionally, just prior to shipment, the unit was issued certain replacement equipment of different make and model from that on which it had trained in CONUS. The unit required a brief period in Vietnam to complete training on this equipment.

b. Limiting factors were, as indicated above, insufficient training in the security measures required by the unit's intended mission, and need for "transition training" on certain newly issued equipment.

c. Two major actions might have been taken to improve the readiness of the 116th Bn:

(1) The unit might have been provided, in training, the equipment with which it would operate in Vietnam.

(2) When it had been determined that the 116th Bn would be deployed to Vietnam, the infusion of about 20% active Army Officers and 10-15% active Army NCO's, drawn from mid-tour personnel from the intended area of deployment, would have enabled the unit to focus its final training more precisely on mimimum requirements and security peculiarities of Vietnam.

d. The 116th Bn underwent 4 months of post-mobilization, pre-deployment training and processing in CONUS. Approximately two months of this time was spent in training, approximately one month in POM leaves, and approximately one month awaiting to deploy. There is evidence that unit morale declined during the final month prior to deployment, and that a 3 month period in CONUS prior to deployment would have been sufficient.

5. Commander's Evaluation: The performance of the 116th Bn on its current mission is fully as professional as that of any RA battalion in the 18th Brigade, and exceeds that of several of the RA battalions. However, the mission assigned to the 116th Bn was selected to take advantage of the nature of the unit and the civilian background and experience of its personnel. I do not judge that the battalion would perform with the same effectiveness as the RA combat battalions in response to quick reaction, combat-oriented mission assignments where it lacks equivalent military experience and transferrable civilian background.

ANNEX N

EVALUATION OF THE 116TH ENGINEER BATTALION
FROM MAY 1969 TO AUGUST 1969
BY BG MORRIS, CG, 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

1. At the time that I assumed command of the Brigade, on 3 May 1969, the 116th Engineer Battalion had been in-country for almost eight months. During that preceding period, the problems which had initially plagued the unit had been resolved. It is understandable that such a unit, fresh from the States, would initially be somewhat overly concerned with its security, unsure of what it could or should do, and weak in the implementation of an administrative system with which it had little dealing back home in Idaho. One can also understand the reluctance of the personnel to even come over here, which possibly contributed to their initial lack of purpose and confidence and to their reluctance to really "dig in." Once the transition was made and the unit accepted the fact that it would be here for a year, I believe the battalion actually set out to prove that it was as good as any other unit over here. I observed the battalion during this period of proving itself.

2. I can evaluate the 116th Engineer Battalion subjectively on the following:

a. LOC: LOC effort involved maintenance and upgrade of QL-20. This work project included primarily the laying of sub-base and base course. It performed this work in a very efficient and professional manner which was equal to like RA units in the Brigade.

b. Operational Support: The quality of its work varied from excellent to outstanding. The battalion accomplished mission assignments effectively and efficiently. Although a considerable amount of operational support was of a minor variety, all projects were approached in an enthusiastic, professional manner. In this area, the battalion was at least equal to and perhaps better than the other combat battalions in the Brigade. It had several things in its favor - most of the men possessed related civilian skills, they were older and more mature, and they were also trying to prove that they were as good as any other unit over here.

c. Basecon: The only significant area of effort involving basecon assigned to the 116th was the construction of MACV facilities. Of the 40 MACV projects assigned to the Brigade, 7 belonged to the 116th. Of the 20 that were completed 6 belonged to the 116th and the 7th is 92% complete and requires only the drilling of a well. Although there was a tremendous shortage of materials experienced by the 116th in May, all facilities were completed by July. This occurred even though it was the farthest unit from any source of supply. The construction by the 116th was of high quality. Apparently realizing it would be leaving soon, the battalion did not wish to leave behind any "unfinished business" which could be completed by just a little extra effort on its part.

ANNEX N (Continued)

d. RDS: The 116th took a great interest in the local national population, and, when it was able to devote effort to civic action, the battalion worked with gusto. The men seemed to have sympathy for and even a kinship with the Vietnamese people.

e. Maintenance: The average monthly deadline rate of the unit was 4.65%. This rate is unusually low and was almost half that of the next highest battalion sized unit. This, I feel, was due to the new equipment they brought with them, their low personnel turbulence, and the greater professional ability and maturity of their operators. In addition, I feel there was a greater than normal respect for the equipment and what it can do. Many of the men had worked with similar equipment in their civilian occupations.

f. Other: The 116th Engineer Battalion compiled an enviable record in many other measurable areas. It had the least number of motor vehicle accidents in the Brigade. It led the Brigade in chapel attendance, was third lowest in the rate of significant incidents and had the fourth lowest VD rate. These achievements reinforce the conclusion that the 116th was a highly effective, well led, and well motivated unit.

3. In summary, at the time of its departure the 116th was as good, and in many cases better, than its RA counterparts. Some of the factors causing this are tangible - their unit integrity, their extensive prior training, the background and civilian occupations of their personnel, and the quality of their equipment. Other factors are intangibles - unit and regional pride, less personnel turbulence than most RA units, and a desire to prove their worth.

ANNEX O

EVALUATION OF THE 116TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)
FROM SEPTEMBER 1968 TO NOVEMBER 1968
BY COL FOWLER, CO, 35TH ENGINEER GROUP

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. It was immediately capable of preparing its primary mission; this was illustrated by the fact that it was airlifted directly into Phan Rang AFB where it immediately began planning and construction of its own facilities. These facilities were at new base camps some one hundred miles distant in areas where no sizeable US units had previously been located.

b. There were no apparent limiting factors.

c. The only improvements that might have been made after mobilization were in the area of officer and non-commissioned officer personnel. Some two months after arrival in Vietnam, the Battalion Commander decided, with my approval and that of the Brigade Commander, to shift several of the officers and non-commissioned officers to new jobs. These shifts might have been accomplished prior to departure for Vietnam, although the need for such shift may not have been apparent at the time.

d. I cannot answer this question, since I am not aware of what the Post M-Day Training period was.

5. Commander's Evaluation: It was difficult to compare the 116th with other combat battalions, because for one thing the 116th arrived with all of its equipment, and all of it essentially new. At the time of its arrival in 1968, other combat battalions in my group were under-equipped with old and worn out equipment. For an engineer unit the quantity and quality of its equipment is a most significant part of its capability. From the personnel view, in like manner, the 116th was at full or overstrength, at the time other combat units were at 85-90% strength. However, it was perfectly clear from the beginning, and was verified as time went by, the team-work necessary in good units came naturally to the 116th, perhaps because of long periods of close personal association. In this regard, and summing up everything in general, I would say that the 116th was much superior to one of the other two other combat battalions which at some point in time were in the 35th Engineer Group. The second battalion was operating under such difficult circumstances that I could not logically compare them.

ANNEX P

EVALUATION OF THE 116TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)
FROM DECEMBER 1968 THROUGH JUNE 1969
BY COL BARNES, CO, 35TH ENGINEER GROUP

1. General. During the seven months period, the 116th Engineer Battalion has improved its performance considerably and continuously. Maintenance management in the unit and the status of vehicles and equipment has been outstanding and the best of the five battalions within the 35th Engineer Group. The unit morale has remained high, and the unit has demonstrated pride in its fine accomplishments.

2. Operations.

a. For some time after its arrival in Vietnam, the battalion failed to act aggressively towards assigned missions, hesitating to follow orders and guidance. This unsureness seemed to disappear once the unit had completed several major projects. Although the 116th is a combat engineer battalion, the unit was assigned a wide variety of tasks requiring skills not normally associated with a combat battalion. Nearly all assigned jobs were accomplished in an efficient and highly professional manner. Since it is a National Guard unit, the 116th is unique among other Army combat engineer battalions. The men in the unit have been organized and have worked together as a unit for many years. Generally speaking, the men are older, more mature, and have acquired professional or trade skills in their civilian communities. This background of skills has been of great assistance in accomplishing the myriad of assigned tasks more professionally and of a higher calibre than would normally be expected of the same type Regular Army unit. Though they have lacked specialized equipment for some projects, the 116th has developed several innovations and adaptations to facilitate and to improve the efficiency of the work.

b. Besides having demonstrated its ability to provide high quality work on jobs requiring carpenting, masonary, plumbing, and electrical skills, the unit has consistently performed well at combat engineering tasks such as minesweeping, tactical bridging, fortifications, and demolitions. The 116th has established some of the most secure and best fortified base camps within the 35th Engineer Group. The battalion has shown a remarkable ability for moving units rapidly, efficiently, and securely - and for redeploying their work effort in the new location. It is felt that experience gained while on National Guard status in Idaho of moving considerable distances is the primary reason that the units have been able to redeploy so effectively. This experience cannot always be realized by National Guard units because so much depends on whether the units are able to acquire projects and whether they are allotted funds and time for such training.

ANNEX P (Continued)

c. Although the battalion has been assigned and has accomplished all types of tasks, the bulk of its effort has gone into the maintenance, repair, restoration, and upgrading of roads and airfields. With one attached light equipment company, the 116th has approached the production of a construction battalion in the placement of fill and base course. Assigned the principal task of restoring 41 kilometers of badly deteriorated highway in December 1968, the 116th completed this task within three months and continued the deliberate upgrading of this section, completing over 50 percent of the required upgrade. The high production rate and quality of the completed horizontal construction demonstrates their excellent ability in this area.

3. Security. The battalion has been extremely security conscious since arriving in Vietnam. The security established in their base camps is better than most found in Vietnam. Defense structures and fortifications were rapidly established at all locations that the units have occupied. As a result of the definitive security procedures and the training of the men, it is felt that many casualties have been averted in areas where sniper, ambush, and mining incidents are encountered frequently.

4. Civic Action. The battalion has been most active in assisting the people within the large area in which it is deployed. Most of the assistance has involved the use of equipment. The unit has cleared brush and trees around numerous villages to improve security, dug wells, improved drainage, hauled fill, and improved village roads. The 116th has also provided non-usable materials and technical assistance to villages, schools, and churches.

5. Administration. The 116th Engineer Battalion came under administrative control of the 35th Engineer Group on 14 September 1968. During the period September 1968 to December 1968, the unit showed a weakness in active Army administrative procedures. This weakness can be attributed to lack of familiarity with active Army regulations and other directives. Primarily, active Army procedures distributed as interim changes by means of letters and messages were completely missing from this unit. Even with this handicap, the unit attempted to comply with all active Army Regulations by taking a positive approach based on common sense and personal experience of assigned personnel. The unit's administration has improved to the point that in comparison to other active Army battalions it is now on par with them, and, in some instances, much better than their active Army counterparts.

6. Maintenance. This battalion's maintenance management program may not be entirely within prescribed procedures; however, it is extremely effective.

a. Initially, the battalion's maintenance management program was not followed at the lower echelons in that they were not operator maintenance conscious. These areas have shown steady improvement. The basic problem remains lack of knowledge and not lack of desire or attitude.

ANNEX P (Continued)

b. Maintenance personnel are well qualified to perform DS and GS maintenance. Generally speaking, this unit has never had effective DS engineer maintenance support and has had to accomplish the majority of these tasks itself.

c. The resupply of repair parts has normally been expedited on its own initiative. Had the battalion not taken the initiative, its deadline rate would be considerably higher.

d. During the early phases of this period, the battalion's deadline rate was above the desired goals but not totally unacceptable. The deadline rate has dropped to an extremely low level at the present time.

e. In summation, the battalion lacked knowledge in maintenance management, but, with continued command emphasis, it has shown steady improvement.

7. Morale. The morale of the men has remained high. The men of the 116th are extremely proud of their accomplishments. This pride in their work and accomplishments is felt to be the result of the unit's being assigned and maintained without infusion in Vietnam and the plan for the battalion to return as a unit to CONUS. This spirit probably would not have prevailed or would have diminished had the unit been infused. Also, the unit's esprit and pride is enhanced by the fact that the men come from the same part of the United States.

8. Summary. Upon arriving in Vietnam, personnel of the 116th Engineer Battalion seemed to possess the required skills and abilities; however, they lacked the singleness of purpose and confidence in their ability. Through definitive guidance, the gaining of experience, and the completion of some major projects, the 116th seemed to gain confidence in its work, which resulted from better command and control and improved staff actions. The 116th Engineer Battalion has performed all assigned missions in an outstanding and professional manner. The quality and efficiency in accomplishing its tasks clearly demonstrates the fine quality of leadership, knowledge, and skills possessed by the unit. Apparently, the unit was well trained and prepared for its assignment in Vietnam, with the possible exception of administrative procedures. As a result of experience and guidance, and the assignment of an outstanding RA engineer major as executive officer, the units administrative procedures improved to the level of the other battalions within the group in approximately six months. The condition of the equipment, the high percent of PLL fill, and the excellent maintenance in the battalion are worthy of special note. In general, the performance of the 116th has been commendable, and the unit has conducted itself in a highly professional manner.

ANNEX 2

EVALUATION OF THE 116TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)
FROM JULY 1969 TO AUGUST 1969
BY COL GRIFFITH, CO, 35TH ENGINEER GROUP

I assumed command of the 35th Group on 20 July 1969. At that time the 116th Engineer Battalion (Cbt) was beginning its stand-down and was ceasing or turning over its operation to its replacement unit. Therefore, I was unable to observe them sufficiently for comparison with the other like RA units in the Group and can only refer to the remarks of my predecessor, COL Barnes.

INITIAL REPORT ON EVALUATION OF A NATIONAL GUARD UNIT

THE 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LIGHT EQUIPMENT) (U)

1. History.

a. On 11 April 1968, the 131st Engineer Company (LE), a National Guard unit stationed at Burlington, Vermont, received notification of impending mobilization into federal service. On 22 April, all commissioned, warrant, and non-commissioned officers were activated; the remainder of the company was called up on 13 May. Two days later, the unit moved by rail and by road to Fort Belvoir, Virginia for basic unit training. After training ended in late August, unit equipment was shipped to the Republic of Vietnam. Personnel followed by air on 19 September and arrived on the 21st of that month at Tuy Hoa, except for a small advance party which had departed earlier.

b. Upon arrival, the unit located most of its equipment at Vung Ro Bay. Some heavy items were unloaded at Cam Ranh Bay and were reclaimed there. Of these, six scraper units and the rock crusher were transferred to another unit being relocated. Replacement scrapers were picked up on a lateral transfer.

c. Initially, the 131st was based at Phu Hiep under the control of the 577th Engineer Battalion (Construction). Early in October, the 572nd Engineer Company (LE) moved from North Field, Tuy Hoa; the 131st occupied that unit's quarters and assumed its duties, including operation of Chop Chai Quarry. Elements of the unit were involved in road work on QL-1, and assisted in other tasks such as maintenance of bridges.

d. On 11 October, the 131st received notice that the company would be transferred to a new quarry site near Ban Me Thuot, and attached to the 70th Engineer Battalion (Combat). An advance party from the quarry section arrived at the new camp on 12 October; and the remainder of the unit closed on 9 November.

e. For a few weeks thereafter, much of the unit's output went toward improvement of base camp facilities and defenses. However, line of communication work began immediately and soon absorbed the company's primary effort. During November, a 75 TPH rock crusher at the camp began quantity production. On 16 November, a heavy equipment started scarifying, reshaping and recompacting badly rutted sections of QL-21, the main road link between Ban Me Thuot and the coastal region to the east. A week later, construction was initiated on an earth-surfaced airstrip for light aircraft near the village of Buon Ea Yong.

f. The company continued to work on a variety of projects to include quarrying and crushing rock; surfacing airfields and taxiways; placing road base course; grading and compacting; driving piles and excavating for bridges; paving roads with plant mix and also with penetration macadam.

In addition, much was accomplished in the field of civic action. The company helped relocate and resettle Montagnard villagers and their homes in support of the RVN pacification program.

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. On arrival in RVN, the 131st was immediately capable of performing its primary mission after receipt of previously shipped equipment. As mentioned earlier, some heavy equipment was given up, but was soon replaced. The unit quickly had an opportunity to demonstrate its proficiency, and was proved fully capable.

b. During the mobilization period, there was evidence of a lack of centralized prior planning which could have grsatly simiplified and facilitated the call-up.

(1) On activation, the Table of Organization and Equipment for the company was changed from TO&E 5-54 D to 5-58 G. This necessitated replacement of many items of equipment, including dozers, tractors, scrapers, cranes and trucks. Although operational personnel were able to adjust rapidly, those responsible for maintaining the equipment had little opportunity to become familiar with it, even during formal training at Fort Belvoir. Since occasions for actual maintsnance training wsre scarce in the National Guard because full tims civilian employees did most of ths work, ths maintsnancs capability had been allowed to deteriorate seriously. The net result of thess circumstancss has bsen a continuing problem with maintenance of equipment. Whersin only the talents of a fsw highly capable individuals and the willing efforts of many unskilled helpsrs havs enabled the unit to continus operations without significant interruptions.

(2) During prsparation for movsmsnt from Vermont to Virginia, lack of prior planning caused considsrable confusion. The unit had no knowledgs of which itsms of squipment would bs lsft behind, and which would go by rail or by road. Decisions wsrs reached hurriedly in consultation with ssnior advisor at Fort Bslvoir, and wsre subject to frequsnt changs. Soms items wsrs processed for rail shipment, and then dsprocesssd. There was no prearranged schsms for prsparing vshiclss for rail movsmsnt; unit psrsonnsl had to travel to Fort Dsvsns to requsst advice, assistancs, and materials.

(3) According to ths unit commander, training on uss of asphalt distributors was not adequats. Ths squipment was quite old, and was rarely used during National Guard duty bscauss of lack of funds for procurement of asphalt. At Fort Bslvoir, the distributor was not opsrative, and thsre wsre fsw chances to work with similar equipmsnt. Two other distributors, also vsry old, wsre assigned to the company and prepared for shipment. Continued operation of thsss items has bsen a problsm bscause of difficulty of maintsnancs and shortags of rspair parts.

(4) The post M-Day training conducted at Fort Belvoir encompassed basic unit training for a Light Equipment Company, with some specialized courses interspersed in preparation for overseas movement. It is believed that this training was quite adequate on the whole, with certain exceptions as noted elsewhere. The training period could not have been shortened appreciably without detracting from unit readiness. In fact, there would have been some benefit derived from extending the time frame to provide more familiarization with various types of equipment.

(a) There were no track drills available for training quarry section personnel, although this type is most common in Vietnam. Very little practical work was offered in drilling and blasting at Fort Belvoir, which was unfortunate, since the same situation has prevailed during National Guard status. None the less, the unit was able to learn the details of maintenance and operation quickly during on-the-job training.

(b) The rock crusher at Fort Belvoir was operated on a demonstration basis only, which provided little practical experience. National Guard training had also been very limited. The effect of this has been difficult to assess. The unit has become very proficient over the past several months, and there is no evidence of any significant lack of proper care of the equipment. However, the crusher has had a continuous history of breakdowns, both major and minor. It is possible that additional prior training would have precluded some of this trouble.

(c) Training on asphalt distribution is discussed above.

(d) Maintenance training is discussed above.

3. Statistical Information.

a. Discipline, Law and Order: In general, the company has had an excellent record. There have been no courts-martial, and relatively few punishments meted out under Article 15, UCMJ, as indicated below.

TYPE	NUMBER
General Court-Martial	0
Special Court-Martial	0
Summary Court-Martial	0
Article 15	17

b. Casualties:

TYPE	NUMBER
KIA	0
WIA	1
NHD	0
NHI	3

c. Awards and Decorations:

TYPE	NUMBER
Unit Awards	0
Individual Awards	6
Bronze Star (Service)	(5)
Army Commendation Medal (Achievement)	62
Purple Heart	1

d. AGI and CMMI Reports:

(1) The unit underwent an Annual General Inspection in August 1968 while at Fort Belvoir, receiving a rating of satisfactory.

(2) No Command Maintenance Management Inspection was conducted during their period of service with the Brigade.

e. Personnel:

(1) The following is a resume of the unit personnel strengths, broken down into RA, AUS and NG:

	RA	AUS	NG
Sep 68	6	17	166
Oct 68	5	15	165
Nov 68	5	14	164
Dec 68	5	15	164
Jan 69	4	17	162
Feb 69	5	15	161
Mar 69	6	12	155
Apr 69	6	15	153
May 69	6	13	153
Jun 69	6	14	151
Jul 69	6	14	150
Aug 69	6	13	147

(2) The following is a breakdown of losses in NG personnel while in Vietnam and reasons therefor:

Reassigned in-country	0
MEDEVAC	6
Compassionate reassignment	5
Emergency Leave (PCS)	2
ETS	2
Early out	3
Hardship discharge	0
Deceased	0

f. Promotions: The following is a resume of all promotions, broken down into officer and enlisted personnel:

	TO
1LT	2
E6	3
E5	48
E4	30

g. Sick Call and VD Rates:

(1) Number Treated During Period - 946

(a) Non-battle injuries - 7

(b) Diarrheal Disease - 9

(c) Common Respiratory Disease - 64

(d) Disease of Skin and Cellular Tissue - 191

(e) VD - 35

(2) Number hospitalized/evacuated - 18

h. Voluntary Extensions:

(1) Extensions - none.

(2) RA enlistments - none.

i. Organizational Maintenance Records: The average monthly equipment deadline rate for the 131st Engineer Company (LE) was 15.9%. A tabulation of Material Readiness and Forstat Reports reveals that the unit was C-1 until October 1968 when it dropped to C-2. It remained there for the remainder of its period of service due to a continuing shortage of repair parts.

j. Equipment Losses:

Type	Number	Cause
Drill, Wagon	1	Accident
Grader, Road	1	Accident
Roller, 15 Ton	1	Accident
Entrenching Machine	1	Accident

Note: Unit had no combat losses.

k. Accomplishments/Missions:

TYPE EFFORT	PERCENTAGE
Operational Support	15
Line of Communication	70
Base Construction	10
Civic Action	5

l. Significant Engagements: None.

4. Comparative Analysis.

a. Discipline, Law, and Order - Annex A

b. Casualties - Annex B

c. Awards and Decorations - Annex C

d. AGI and CMMI Reports - Annex D

e. Personnel - Annex E

f. Promotions - Annex F

g. Sick Call and VD Rates - Annex G

h. Voluntary Extensions - Annex H

i. Organizational Maintenance Records - Annex I

j. Equipment Losses - Annex J

k. Accomplishments/Missions - Annex K

l. Significant Engagements - Annex L

5. Commander's Evaluation.

a. Evaluation by BG Elder - Annex M

b. Evaluation by BG Morris - Annex N

c. Evaluation by COL Fowler - Annex O

d. Evaluation by COL Barnes - Annex P

e. Evaluation by COL Griffith - Annex Q

f. Evaluation by LTC O'Connell - Annex R

g. Evaluation by LTC Hayes - Annex S

6. Other Information. Effective orientation of the personnel of a NG unit is an emperative and must not be taken for granted. Their personnel have not voluntarily selected a military career, are not highly motivated toward it, and tend to be intensely critical of actions which they do not understand.

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ANNEX A

DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

TYPE	131st	572nd	137th	591st	630th	584th	15th
Article 15	17	54	NVAL	42	11	40	28
Summary Courts-martial	0	0		2	0	2	5
Special Courts-martial	0	1		9	3	1	4
General Courts-martial	0	1		0	0	1	0

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3a and indicates UCMJ infractions for the 131st LE Co compared to corresponding RA units. The numbers shown for the 131st LE Co are for the period September 1968 - August 1969. For all other units the numbers shown are for the period October 1968 - June 1969, the only figures available.

Analysis: The 131st ranked second in the lowest number of UCMJ infractions compared to five other corresponding RA units. Statistics were not available for one unit.

ANNEX B

CASUALTIES

TYPE	131st	572nd	137th	591st	630th	584th	15th
KIA	0	0	2	0	0	0	NVAL
KNHA	0	0	2	1	0	0	
WIA	1	0	9	2	3	0	
WNHA	0	1	1	2	0	0	

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3b and reflects the number of casualties inflicted on the 131st LE Co, in comparison with corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 131st was tied for second in the lowest number of casualties compared with four other corresponding RA units.

ANNEX C

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

TYPE	131st	572nd	137th	591st	630th	584th	15th
Legion of Merit	0	0	0	0	0	0	NVAL
Bronze Star (Achievement)	5	5	3	2	6	4	
Bronze Star (Valor)	0	0	2	1	0	2	
ARCOM (Achievement)	62	15	22	19	18	11	
ARCOM (Valor)	0	0	5	9	2	0	
Purple Heart	1	0	2	3	9	8	
Unit Awards/Decorations	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3c and reflects the number of awards and decorations received by the 131st LE Co in comparison to corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 131st ranked first in the number of awards and decorations for achievement compared to five other corresponding units. The 131st ranked fifth in the number of awards and decorations for valor compared to five other corresponding RA units.

ANNEX D

AGI AND CMMI REPORTS

1. AGI Reports.

The AGI scores are not given for individual or separate companies. Rather, their rating determines the overall score that the battalion to which they are attached receives. All the combat battalions to which Light Equipment companies were attached received satisfactory ratings during their last AGI's.

2. CMMI Reports.

The 131st Engineer Company (LE) did not receive a CMMI while it was assigned to the 18th Engineer Brigade and therefore cannot be compared with other like units in this area.

ANNEX E

PERSONNEL

1. Personnel Strengths

UNIT	AUTH	SEP 68	OCT 68	NOV 68	DEC 68	JAN 69	FEB 69	MAR 69	APR 69	MAY 69	JUN 69	JUL 69	AUG 69
131st	180	189	185	173	184	183	181	173	174	172	171	170	163
572nd	180	154	148	146	171	180	191	187	173	175	181	181	185
137th	180	171	168	158	150	157	161	150	143	141	154	195	169
591st	180	182	187	186	181	174	177	162	162	165	167	171	166
630th	180	109	127	146	157	166	172	173	138	157	167	171	166
584th	180	162	147	163	167	176	188	183	160	168	156	152	182
15th	180	156	144	176	163	167	162	164	172	166	152	176	183

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3e and reflects the overall personnel posture of the 131st LE Co in comparison to corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 131st ranked first in the number of personnel assigned during the period Sep 68 through Aug 69 compared to five other corresponding RA units.

2. Personnel Losses

TYPE	131st	572nd	137th	591st	630th	584th
Reassigned In-Country	0	4	11	12	3	22
MEDEVAC	6	2	11	7	5	10
Compassionate Reassignment	5	2	0	0	0	0
Emergency Leave (PCS)	2	0	2	8	3	1
ETS	3	65	57	71	64	39
Early Out	2	0	1	2	4	0
Hardship Discharges	0	0	1	0	0	0
Deceased	0	1	4	1	1	0

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3e and reflects the number and type of losses in the 131st Engr Co (LE) compared to losses in corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 131st ranked sixth in the total number of losses compared to five other corresponding RA units.

ANNEX F

PROMOTIONS

TO	131st	572nd	137th	591st	630th	584th	15th
1LT	2	NVAL	0	1	0	4	NVAL
E6	3		0	2	2	4	
E5	48		14	66	21	47	
E4	30		20	101	28	75	

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3f and reflects the number of promotions in the 131st Engr Co (LE) compared to corresponding RA units.

Analysis: The 131st ranked third in the number of individual promotions compared with four corresponding RA units. Statistics were not available for two units.

ANNEX G

SICK CALL AND VD RATES

1. Sick Call and VD Rates: All figures are average monthly incidents only and are not rates based on a 1,000 troop strength standard.

	15th	131st	137th	572nd	584th	591st	630th
Sick Call	72.0	86.0	NVAL	NVAL	129.0	116.8	107.1
Venereal Disease	3.9	3.2	NVAL	NVAL	3.0	0.8	1.2

2. Number Hospitalized/Evacuated

15th	131st	137th	572nd	584th	591st	630th
93	18	NVAL	NVAL	53	48	44

3. Primary causes of sick call over the period were minor wounds, upper respiratory infection, venereal disease, diarrheal disease, and diseases of skin and cellular tissue.

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ANNEX H

VOLUNTARY EXTENSIONS

TYPE	131st	572nd	137th	591st	630th	584th	15th
Reenlistments	0	1	1	2	2	2	NVAL
Extensions (EM)	C	1	0	1	1	2	

Facts: This chart is keyed to paragraph 3h and reflects the voluntary extensions in the 131st LE Co, in comparison to corresponding RA units. The chart applies to enlisted personnel only. There were no voluntary officer extensions in the 131st LE Co.

Analysis: The 131st did not have any voluntary extensions or reenlistments, any comparison would be nebulous.

ANNEX I

ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE RECORDS

Average Monthly Deadline Rate

131st	15th	137th	572nd	584th	591st	630th
15.9%	13.2%	8.42%	12.3%	17.1%	18.2%	14.8%

The relatively high deadline rate of the 131st Engineer Company can be related to the fact that Light Equipment Companies are not self-supporting and must rely on the Battalion to which they are attached for maintenance support and repair parts. If we examine the area of operations of this unit (Ban Me Thuot) we will discover that both the 131st and 70th Engineer Battalion (Cbt) had this same maintenance problem. This was primarily caused by lack of repair parts and DSU maintenance support. When these units initially moved into the Ban Me Thuot area the maintenance support activity was unable to cope with the increased maintenance and repair parts load that was placed on them by these Engineer Units and suffered growing pains until it was adequately staffed with personnel and had stocked its ASL to provide repair parts support.

ANNEX J

EQUIPMENT LOSSES

1. Combat Losses

	131st	15th	572nd	137th	591st	630th	584th
Crane, RT							2
Compressor, 250 CFM		1					
Generator Set, 10 KW		1					
Grader, road				2			1
Launcher, grenade M79				2			
Mask, Protective				1			
MG, M60				1			
Mount, MG, 122							2
Radio set AN/VRC 46							1
Radio set AN/VRC 47		1					
Radio set AN/Grr 5		1					
Rifle, M14							2
Rifle, M16		3		3	1		
Switchboard, SB22		1					
Scraper, 18 CY				3			
Shop equip, 3/4 ton				1			
Telephone set, TA312							4
Tool Kit, Gen Mech		1		3			27
Tool set #1 Common							1
Tool set #1 Supplemental							1
Trailer, 25 T lowbed							2
Trailer, flatbed							1
Trailer, water, 400 Gal		1					
Tractor, 290M				3			
Truck, cargo, 3/4 T				1			2
Truck, distributor, 2½ T		1					1
Truck, cargo 2½ T		1		1			1
Truck, dump 5 T		2		2			3
Truck, tractor, 5 T		1					3
Truck, tractor, 10 T		1		1			
Truck, wrecker, 5 T				1			
Truck, dump, 20 T							4

2. Accident Losses

a. 137th Engr Co (LE) - none.

b. 591st Engr Co (LE) - none.

c. 630th Engr Co (LE) - none.

d. 572nd Engr Co (LE):

ANNEX J (Continued)

Radio Set AN/VRC 46 - 1
Truck, Tractor, 5 Ton - 1
Truck, Dump, 20 Ton - 1
Truck, Utility, ¼ Ton - 1

e. 15th Engr Co (LE):

Launcher, Grenade - 1
Rifle, M14 - 1
Telephone Set TA 312 - 2
Truck, Dump - 2

f. 584th Engr Co (LE):

Rifle, M16 - 1
Telephone Set TA 312 - 2
Trailer, water, 400 Gal - 1
Truck, dump, 5 Ton - 1
Truck, tractor, 10 Ton - 1

g. 131st Engr Co (LE):

Drill, wagon - 1
Entrenching machine - 1
Grader, Road - 1
Roller, 13 Ton, 9 tire - 1

ANNEX K

ACCOMPLISHMENTS/MISSIONS

	131st	15th	137th	572nd	584th	591st	630th
Operational/Combat Suppot	15%	36%	63%	31%	35%	72%	59%
LOC	70%	60%	35%	66%	60%	25%	38%
Base Construction	10%	3.2%	2%	1.4%	3.8%	2.5%	2.2%
RDS & Other	5%	0.8%	0%	1.6%	1.2%	0.5%	0.8%

ANNEX L

SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENTS

1. 15th Engineer Company (LE): The number of significant engagements were 54 with the following major enemy engagements:

a. Battle of Dak To.

b. Seige of Ben Het.

The results of these were 23 KIA and 130 WIA.

2. 131st Engineer Company (LE): None.

3. 137th Engineer Company (LE):

Mines and Booby Traps - 10
KIA - 2
WIA - 13

4. 572nd Engineer Company (LE): None.

5. 584th Engineer Company (LE): One significant engagement on 21 March 1969, a sapper attack on Wooley Bully. Results - 2 KIA and 10 WIA.

6. 591st Engineer Company (LE):

Mines and Booby Traps - 6
Rocket and Mortar Attacks - 4
KIA - 0
WIA - 0

7. 630th Engineer Company (LE):

Mines and Booby Traps - 3
Rocket and Mortar Attacks - 7
Ambushes - 1
KIA - 6
WIA - 21

ANNEX M

EVALUATION OF 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LIGHT EQUIPMENT)
FROM SEPTEMBER 1968 TO APRIL 1969
BY BG ELDER, CG, 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. When the 131st Engr Co (LE) arrived in Vietnam it was immediately capable of performing its primary technical mission. However, I did not consider it sufficiently well trained in security to warrant its commitment to its intended mission prior to the completion of an in-country orientation dealing primarily with security and knowledge of enemy tactics and techniques. Additionally, just prior to shipment, the unit was issued certain replacement equipment of different make and model from that on which it had trained in CONUS. The unit required a brief period in Vietnam to complete training on this equipment.

b. Limiting factors were, as indicated above, insufficient training in the security measures required by the units intended mission, and need for "transition" training on certain newly issued equipment.

c. Two major actions might have been taken to improve the readiness of the 131st Engr Co (LE).

(1) The unit might have been provided, in training, the equipment with which it would operate in Vietnam.

(2) When it had been determined that the 131st Engr Co would be deployed to Vietnam, the infusion of about 20% active Army officers and 10-15% active Army NCO's, drawn from mid-tour personnel from the intended area of deployment, would have enabled the unit to focus its final training more precisely on mission requirements and security peculiarities of Vietnam.

d. The 131st Engr Co underwent 5 months of post-mobilization, predeployment training and processing in CONUS. Approximately three months of this time was spent in training, approximately one month in POM leaves, and approximately one month waiting to deploy. There is evidence that unit morale declined during the final month prior to deployment, and that a 4 month period in CONUS prior to deployment would have been sufficient.

5. Commander's Evaluation. The performance of the 131st Lt Engr Co on its current mission has been competent and professional. However, it lacks the drive and ingenuity in overcoming problems displayed by like RA units. I also do not believe this unit to have the flexibility and general military know-how to operate as effectively as the like RA units in a dynamic, moving situation.

ANNEX N

EVALUATION OF THE 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LE)
FROM MAY 1969 TO AUGUST 1969
BY BG MORRIS, CG, 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

The 131st Engineer Company (Light Equipment) performed in an excellent fashion during the period of my command. The 131st was engaged in a variety of airfield construction, road building, and quarrying tasks in the II Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam. Consistently high quality workmanship, thorough planning, and efficient organization prove the professional skill of this National Guard unit. The company made an important and valued contribution to the engineer effort of this Brigade.

In addition, association of Regular Army units with the National Guard provided a unique opportunity for mutual professional development and the exchange of technical and military skills. The civilian expertise of the 131st was enhanced through exposure to the tactical necessitites of the combat zone. In retrospect, I would recommend a limited (15%) one time immediate infusion of selected Regular Army personnel, from within the theater, into National Guard units of company size deployed into the combat zone. This procedure would provide an in-house capability for immediate tactical operation.

In summary, the performance of the 131st Engineer Company (Light Equipment) was excellent. This unit significantly improved its overall military capabilities while assigned to the 18th Engineer Brigade.

ANNEX O

EVALUATION OF THE 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LE)
FROM JUNE 1968 TO NOVEMBER 1968
BY COL FOWLER, CO, 35TH ENGINEER GROUP

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. When the unit arrived in Vietnam, it was immediately capable of performing its primary mission; this was illustrated by the fact that it was airlifted directly to its initial destination, Tuy Hoa, where it immediately moved into a tactical cantonment and began work. This initial work included operation of a quarry and rock crusher, both of which were undertaken with no apparent problems. After about 30 days, the unit was required to move some 100 miles by aircraft and by road to a remote location where US Troops had never been. This move and subsequent operations were completed with no more difficulty than normal.

b. There were no apparent limiting factors.

c. There are no improvements which I can think of, which could have been made in preparing the unit.

d. I cannot answer this question, since I am not aware of what the post M-Day Training period was.

5. Commander's Evaluation. The 131st Engineer Light Equipment Company was superior to the two other light equipment companies that were assigned to my group at the time. There were essentially three reasons for this:

a. The 131st had all of its equipment, all in new condition.

b. The 131st had 100% of its assigned personnel.

c. The experience level of the men was considerably above the regular Army units, since the RA units were made up essentially of inductees or first tour enlistees.

ANNEX P

EVALUATION OF THE 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LE)
FROM DECEMBER 1968 THROUGH JUNE 1969
BY COL BARNES, CO, 35TH ENGINEER GROUP

1. General. During the seven months period, the 131st Engineer Company has performed its assigned tasks adequately. During the first half of the period, the company's maintenance suffered greatly because of a lack of DSU maintenance support, a good maintenance management program, qualified personnel, and a positive attitude of overcoming their maintenance problems. A generally widespread negative attitude towards serving in Vietnam has diminished during the period, and morale has improved in the unit. Appearance and general military conduct, though improved, could still be improved considerably.

2. Operations. The company has been principally involved in road construction and support of the 70th Engineer Battalion with equipment. The company has done excellent work on the road repairs and construction that it has been assigned. Its equipment operators are generally considered to be well trained and experienced with the exception of the crusher and quarry operators. This problem with the crusher and quarry personnel can be attributed to the lack of training and experience while the unit was on National Guard status and during its mobilization training. At no time had the quarry section actually operated a quarry. This lack of experience and training has been evident in the frequent problems encountered in the 131st quarry and crusher operations and the corresponding low production relative to other group units.

3. Civic Action. The company has been very active in assisting the local populace and the RVN government. Most of their effort in this area has involved providing equipment and vehicles for such projects as improving village defenses, clearing areas for refugee villages, and excavating of water wells.

4. Discipline and Morale. Besides not being fully technically prepared, the 131st had not been militarily and psychologically prepared for employment in Vietnam. This was manifested in unjustified complaints being made to the news media and politicians in the unit's home state of Vermont to the effect that its presence was not required in Vietnam. This feeling was allowed to continue by the unit commander and supervisors for some time without correction or explanation. Since the unit's negative attitude has been overcome, its morale has improved significantly. Although the unit has not been involved in any serious incidents, its personnel have been lax in military dress and appearance. This continues as a result of the supervisors' laxity in establishing and maintaining an appropriate standard and has contributed to the general informality between the officers, the NCO's, and the troops not normally found or associated with active Army units.

ANNEX P (Continued)

5. Maintenance. This company has had many problems in the maintenance area, the majority of which could have been resolved within the unit had the commander taken a positive attitude. The commander openly displays an attitude of indifference toward maintenance. The unit contains many highly skilled maintenance personnel, but it is basically reluctant to adapt to the existing situation. The personnel are capable of accomplishing DS and some GS repair work but neglect organizational maintenance. The DS support given this unit, however, has been marginal and, in a few instances, non-existent. The unit has been forced to perform some DS/GS repair to keep some critical items operational. The resupply of repair parts has been slow, and the unit has been content to await their arrival. During this period, their deadline rate ranged from extremely high to a low that can be tolerated but not below the desired goal. In summation, the unit has the capability but lacks a sense of urgency.

6. Summary. The unit's shortage of qualified personnel in maintenance and quarry operations has been evident. Outside of these two problem areas, the company has performed well. It is felt that the training and preparation of the 131st Engineer Company for Vietnam duty was inadequate. Increased training in basic military customs, quarry operations, maintenance management, and administration as well as troop information regarding necessity for the unit to be called to active duty and deployed would have better prepared the unit for duty in Vietnam.

ANNEX Q

EVALUATION OF THE 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LE)
FROM JULY 1969 TO AUGUST 1969
BY COL GRIFFITH, CO, 35TH ENGINEER GROUP

The 131st Engineer Company (LE) had but one month remaining before it proceeded its stand-down in preparation for departure. I observed their work only infrequently during this month. At the times I did see them they were performing routine LOC work. Based upon those observations, I would say that the men had a high degree of morale and that the company appeared to be very competent in the operation of its equipment and very well organized. A failure to maintain expected standards of military dress and appearance was quite evident. I cannot sufficiently compare them with other Light Equipment companies, however.

ANNEX R

EVALUATION OF THE 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LE)
FROM OCTOBER 1968 THROUGH APRIL 1969
BY LTC O'CONNELL, CO, 70TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. On arrival in RVN, the 131st was immediately capable of performing its primary mission after receipt of previously shipped equipment. As mentioned earlier, some heavy equipment was given up, but was soon replaced. The unit quickly had an opportunity to demonstrate its proficiency, and was proved fully capable.

b. During the mobilization period, there was evidence of a lack of entralized prior planning which could have greatly simiplified and facilitated the call-up.

(1) On activation, the Table of Organization and Equipment for the company was changed from TO&E 5-54 D to 5-58 G. This necessitated replacement of many items of equipment, including dozers, tractors, scrapers, cranes and trucks. Although operational personnel were able to adjust readily, those responsible for maintaining the equipment had little opportunity to become familiar with it, even during formal training at Fort Belvoir. Since occasions for actual maintenance training were scarce in the National Guard because full time civilian employees did most of the work, the maintenance capability had been allowed to deteriorate seriously. The net result of these circumstances has been a continuing proglem with maintenance of equipment. Wherein only the talents of a few highly capable individuals and the willing efforts of many unskilled helpers have enabled the unit to continue operations without significant interruptions.

(2) During preparation for movement from Vermont to Virginia, lack of prior planning caused considerable confusion. The unit had no knowledge of which items of equipment would be left behind, and which would go by rail or by road. Decisions were reached hurriedly in consultation with senior advisors at Fort Belvoir, and were subject to frequent change. Some items were processed for rail shipment, and then deprocessed. There was no prearranged scheme for preparing vehicles for rail movement; unit personnel had to travel to Fort Devens to request advice, assistance, and materials.

(3) According to the unit commander, training on use of asphalt distributors was not adequate. The equipment was quite old, and was rarely used during National Guard duty because of lack of funds for procurement of asphalt. At Fort Belvoir, the distributor was not operative, and

there were few changes to work with similar equipment. Two other distributors, also very old, were assigned to the company and prepared for shipment. Continued operation of these items has been a problem because of difficulty of maintenance and shortage of repair parts.

(4) The post M-Day training conducted at Fort Belvoir encompassed basic unit training for a Light Equipment Company, with some specialized courses interspersed in preparation for overseas movement. It is believed that this training was quite adequate on the whole, with certain exceptions as noted elsewhere. The training period could not have been shortened appreciably without detracting from unit readiness. In fact, there would have been some benefit derived from extending the time frame to provide more familiarization with various types of equipment.

(a) There were no track drills available for training quarry section personnel, although this type is most common in Vietnam. Very little practical work was offered in drilling and blasting at Fort Belvoir, which was unfortunate, since the same situation has prevailed during National Guard status. None the less, the unit was able to learn the details of maintenance and operation quickly during on-the-job training.

(b) The rock crusher at Fort Belvoir was operated on a demonstration basis only, which provided little practical experience. National Guard training had also been very limited. The effect of this has been difficult to assess. The unit has become very proficient over the past several months, and there is no evidence of any significant lack of proper care of the equipment. However, the crusher has had a continuous history of breakdowns, both major and minor. It is possible that additional prior training would have precluded some of this trouble.

(c) Training on asphalt distribution is discussed above.

(d) Maintenance training is discussed above.

5. Commander's Evaluation.

a. General. During the observation period, the company has consistently completed all assigned tasks enthusiastically and energetically. Except for a brief period following attachment to the 70th Engineer Battalion in the Ban Me Thuot area, as described below, unit morale has been high and disciplinary problems few.

b. Operations and Maintenance.

(1) An advance party from the 131st arrived at Hot Rocks Quarry early in October 1968, shortly after the camp was organized. This party immediately took over responsibility for operating the 75 TPH rock crusher then being installed. While a headwall for the crusher was being

ANNEX R (Continued)

erected, rock was fed into the crusher using a clamshell. This limited production considerably for several weeks, since much work was required to properly prepare the rocky area for the headwall. There were large quantities of blast rock standing available in the quarry, which had been operated some years earlier by unidentified parties. The accessibility of this blast rock simplified development of the quarry, since there were some related problems that were difficutl to overcome, such as accumulation of rain water and poor functioning of drills. The direct support ordnance unit responsible for assisting the 131st was not prepared to support such a unit, since there had been little advance warning. Also, the DSU was accustomed to support organizations that had an authorized stockage list, which the 70th Engineer Battalion and the 131st did not have. For several months, it was extremely difficult for the 131st to obtain repair parts for TO&E equipment or for the rock crusher. Many parts were hard to identify or were in short supply. Unit personnel were not completely trained in maintenance procedures, and had some difficulty in diagnosing problems. Despite these shortcomings, the company managed to maintain a very respectable production effort over a period of time and has often exceeded its crushed rock quota when operations were not interrupted by major breakdowns. Much credit for continued output belongs to the Commander and staff, 35th Engineer Group, for untiring efforts to obtain urgently needed parts and to provide essential assistance. Members of the 131st have displayed great ingenuity in keeping the equipment operational, especially considering the lack of skilled support from DSU.

(2) The company arrived in RVN with a prescribed load list (PLL) in excellent condition, approximately 80% full. Since then, the percent of parts not on hand has increased considerably, due partly to heavy demands, but largely to resupply problems. There have been indications that some delays were caused by failure to identify items properly in the requisitions. The DSU has been partly responsible because the basic stock of repair parts to be kept at that level was very slowly accrued, and many requisitions were not filled in a timely manner. The 131st has made a great effort to obtain parts and to perform required maintenance, and is currently within the desired deadline rate.

(3) The unit demonstrated its competence in developing the rock quarry. Although the area had been worked previously, the remaining shelves required much work. Tests of drilling patterns and quantities of explosives soon established the combinations which led to the most satisfactory blasting results. Alternate faces have been developed for use when weather conditions require relocation of the current effort.

(4) Roads and Airfields. The company has proven itself very talented in the construction of roads and airfields. Many unit personnel had been employed in such work in civilian life, and had talents which were quite helpful. Professional surveyors, equipment operators, and such

enabled the unit to accomplish all tasks in this field. Soon after arriving at Hot Rocks, company personnel were engaged in construction of a new earth-surfaced airfield, as well as repair of existing roads. Shortly thereafter, the task of upgrading major roads was begun. Because of difficulty in obtaining a gradation of crushed rock suitable for compaction, the unit employed its equipment to place a form of penetration macadam to stabilize the road surface. In a different location, adequate base course was available, and was used to prepare a base for hot mix asphalt concrete. Hot mix was successfully placed for many kilometers on both new and existing surfaces, under the supervision of the 131st.

c. Security. The company moved to Hot Rocks Quarry shortly after erection of living-fighting bunkers at that camp. The area was very muddy, and in places swampy. A perimeter fence had been emplaced, but defenses were still rudimentary. With great energy, unit personnel proceeded to reinforce the wire fences, clear the fields beyond, build guard towers, raise protective berms, and improve overall camp security immensely. Additional crew-served weapons were obtained, and coordination was made to provide artillery support on call. Outside the compound, it has been necessary to remind personnel to follow prescribed precautions to avoid surprise attacks at work sites, but this is a persistent problem in any relatively quiet area. In general, the 131st has shown itself ready for any contingency; this may account for the dearth of activity on the part of the enemy against the unit.

d. Civic Action. Largely through the employment of equipment not required elsewhere, the company accomplished much work and created considerable good will by assisting the RVN government forces in relocating thousands of Montagnard village refugees. The 131st transported the people, their belongings and housing materials, and provided equipment to help re-erect the dwellings. Ditching machines aided in development of village defenses. In addition, the company assisted in the excavation of water wells.

e. Discipline. There have been no serious incidents involving personnel of the 131st Engineer Company, and no courts-martial during the period of observation. On the other hand, unit personnel have been rather lax in maintaining required standards of dress and appearance, particularly when in their own camp area. Supervisors have been reluctant to insist on high standards, permitting personnel a great deal of leeway in doing without prescribed items such as caps or jackets, or even boots. The poor state of police in the company area has been the subject of several discussions with the unit commander; this has improved some in recent weeks. The company reflects its civilian background in many ways, and does not hold much as sacred which is considered routine in regular Army units. The lines distinguishing officers, non-commissioned

officers and other enlisted ranks are not too clear-cut in the 131st, since many refer to each other informally. However, it would be inaccurate to say that discipline does not exist. Rather, the informality of any unit in a combat zone is carried a bit further in this homogeneous company.

f. Administration. As general the company's administration has not been completely satisfactory. Little emphasis has been put on submitting reports and correspondence within specified deadlines. It has often been necessary to remind the unit repeatedly before urgent items were forwarded. Many documents, upon arrival at this headquarters reflect lack of familiarity with proper format, or inattention to detail. Otherwise, unit files are satisfactory, and publication accounts are properly maintained.

g. Morale. At present, morale is quite high in the company. However, shortly after arriving at Hot Rocks Quarry in November 1968, unit personnel began to feel that their presence was not required in Vietnam. This impression was apparently fostered by the lack of major accomplishment by the 131st up to that time, at least in their eyes. Much effort had gone into necessary but nonglamorous work, such as improving camp facilities and security, and maintaining roads. The majority of the enlisted men signed a letter complaining about their inactivity, sending copies to the press and members of congress. Major General R. M. Cram, Adjutant General of the State of Vermont, made a visit to the company in January 1969. He took the opportunity to examine the complaints, and determined that the unit was busy doing an important job. He encouraged the men to believe in the merit of this work, and recommended that the unit receive additional information verifying this. This was quickly accomplished, and morale has been high since that time.

h. Summary. The 131st Engineer Company (LE) has encountered many difficulties while serving with this battalion. The unit reflects the National Guard origin to some extent by a lack of familiarity with attention to administrative procedures and customs deemed important by the Regular Army. The shortage of skilled maintenance personnel has been evident. Despite these shortcomings, the company has consistently given its maximum effort to all assignments, and has willingly assisted other elements to produce optimum results. The officers and men of the unit are intelligent, courteous, and cooperative. They have reason to be proud of the manner in which they have performed their duty in the Republic of Vietnam.

ANNEX S

EVALUATION OF THE 131ST ENGINEER COMPANY (LE)
FROM MAY 1969 TO THE PRESENT
BY LTC HAYES, CO, 70TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)

The following observations concerning the 131st Engineer Company (LE) are submitted. These observations are based on only the four months I had the 131st Engineer Company (LE) under my command. Their service with the battalion from October 1968 to May 1969 were covered by LTC O'Connell. I have reviewed his letter and am in full agreement. My additional observations are below.

The unit as a group did an outstanding job. The men were in many cases doing the same type job they did in civilian life. They were more experienced and more mature than the average soldier being inducted or enlisted today, and therefore more stable.

Their greatest asset was their lack of turbulence when compared to like RA units. Trained and deployed as a unit, they were a well-built team that performed in a very professional manner. Each man knew what was expected of him and what to expect from the others. With no turnover, their efforts were available for production, with little lost time for retraining.

These attributes had their drawbacks also. Since all the men came from a few small communities in a single locale, they knew one another intimately, as did their families back in Vermont. Many men have personal problems, but few others in the Battalion were as magnified as those that occurred to these men. Frequently idle backyard gossip about one man's family at home got distorted and passed to another man in the unit, then through several others before reaching the man concerned. As a result of this "inbreeding," the family problems of this unit were more distorted and more often common knowledge than in the normal regular unit.

The most serious drawback appears to be in utilization of officers and men by the company commander. Captain Andrews' normal business is selling insurance. His clients in Vermont include the men in his unit and their families. As a result he was reluctant to do anything that would cause him to lose disfavor. It is a credit to the other officers and NCO's that the unit retained as much military character as it did. For this reason alone I would recommend that National Guard officers be individually assigned rather than with their National Guard unit.

AVCC 6 Mar 1969

SUBJECT: Evaluation of National Guard Units

Commanding Officer
18th Engineer Brigade
APO San Francisco 96377

1. One of the most critical problems in Army planning is determining the readiness of Reserve Component units. The time required to mobilize, train, and deploy such units has a direct bearing on the size of STRAF, on the reserve components themselves, and on overall US strategy.

2. We have an opportunity to contribute to future planning involving National Guard units by an evaluation of the performance of the two engineer units deployed to Vietnam last fall. I am inclosing a tentative format for an evaluation of these two units. I would like to have you review this and submit such changes as you think are appropriate. The 18th Brigade should then be prepared to submit this evaluation report within ten days of the departure of the two units for CONUS.

3. Each group and brigade commander who serves over these units should be required to prepare the evaluation required by para 5 of the report. In as much as you were the brigade commander during the arrival period, you should prepare before your departure para 2 of the evaluation, in addition to preparing the evaluation under para 5. Similarly, Colonel Fowler and Lieutenant Colonel O'Connell should submit evaluations before their departures.

1 Incl
as

DAVID S. PARKER
Major General, US Army
Commanding

Incl 3

Evaluation of National Guard Units

1. History. Brief history of unit. When and where mobilized; length and location of training; deployment date; arrival date; assignments in Vietnam.

2. Readiness of Unit.

a. When the unit arrived in Vietnam, was it immediately capable of performing its primary mission? What is the basis for the evaluation?

b. If not, what were the limiting factors?

c. What improvements could have been made in preparing the unit, both post-mobilization and pre-mobilization, insofar as readiness is concerned?

d. What was the post M-day training period for these units? Could it have been shortened without detracting from readiness? How much?

3. Statistical Information.

a. Discipline, Law and Order: A breakdown on number of incidents, the number and type of punishments imposed under UCMJ.

b. Casualties: A breakdown of the number and type of casualties suffered, i.e., KHA, WHA, KNHA, and WNHA.

c. Awards and Decorations: The type and number of individual and unit awards/decorations received.

d. AGI and CMMI Reports: The result of all AGI and CMMI's conducted on the unit during period.

e. Personnel: Personnel strengths by month, broken down into RA, AUS, and NG. Losses in NG personnel while in Vietnam and reasons therefore.

f. Promotions: Promotions in the unit.

g. Sick Call and VD Rates: An evaluation of the number of personnel who were treated during period, major causes, and number hospitalized and/or evacuated.

h. Voluntary Extensions: A tabulation of voluntary extensions to remain on active duty, and the number of Regular Army enlistments.

i. Organizational Maintenance Records: A tabulation of Material Readiness and Forstat Reports submitted during the active duty period. Equipment deadline rates.

j. Equipment Losses: The number and type of equipment losses due to both combat losses and accidents.

k. Accomplishments/Missions: The amount of troop effort expended on projects or missions expressed by percentages, i.e., Operational Support, Direct Combat Support, LOC's, Base Construction, and Civic Action.

l. Significant Engagements: A listing of significant engagements with the enemy, if any, and the results of same.

4. Comparative Analysis.

By appropriate inclosures compare the statistical data in Para 3 above with all corresponding RA units in the brigade.

5. Commander's Evaluation.

Attach, by inclosures, a written subjective analysis of the manner of performance of the National Guard unit compared to like RA units. For the 131st LE Co, an evaluation should be prepared by each CO of battalions to which attached, by each commander of the group to which assigned, and by the brigade commander. For the 116th Engr Combat Bn, all group and brigade commanders in the chain of command should prepare an evaluation.

6. Other Information.

List any problems areas, suggestions for improvement, or topics not covered above which would assist in training, deploying, or utilizing engineer National Guard units in future operations.

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